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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
TRUSTS-CREATION BY PRECATORY WoRDs.-Testatrix used the following
language: "I wish to will my property to my husband, asking that he in
turn leaves it equally to my two children." Held, that the will created a
precatory trust under which the husband took only a life estate. Common-
weath ex rel State Tax Commis.,ion v. Willson's Admr. (Ky. 1929) 21 S. W.
(2d) 814.
The early tendency in England was to hold all precatory expressions in
wills as absolutely binding trusts because the precatory words were merely a
courteous means of creating a duty. Malim v. Keighley (1794) 2 Ves. Jr.
333; Knight v. Knight (1840) 3 Beav. 148. But the court in Portsmouth v.
Shackford (1866) 46 N. H. 423, said: "The current of American authority
and the later English cases is against converting the discretion of the donee
into an absolute trust, and in favor of giving effect more fully than former-
ly, to the intention of the testator, giving to his words their natural and or-
dinary sense." In accord: In re Pennock's Estate (1853) 20 Pa. 268;
Hughes v. Fitzgerald (1905) 78 Conn. 4, 60 Atl. 694; Sands v. Waldo (1917)
100 Misc. Rep. 288, 165 N. Y. S. 654.
The question as to whether or not a trust has been created is largely one
of interpretation. Some writers have attempted to classify the decisions
according to the particular precatory word used by the testator as "wish-
ing," "requesting," "feeling confident," "hoping," etc., but the more practical
rule seems to be to disregard the particular word used since "the use of any
particular precatory word will not determine the question of intent."
Bogert, Trusts (1921) 48. There are, however, certain guides which help
to determine intent. A requirement imposed by some courts is that there
be certainty in the precatory clause as to the parties who are to take and
what they are to take. Floyd v. Smith (1910) 58 Fla. 12, 51 So. 537; Coul-
son v. Alpaugh (1896) 163 Ill. 298, 45 N. E. 216. Other courts, however,
are not the least bit daunted by the fact that discretion in selection within
a named class is left to devisee. Cox v. Wills (1891) 49 N. J. L. 130, 22
Atl. 794; Weber v. Bryant (1894) 161 Mass. 400, 37 N. E. 203.
From the standpoint of the present day tendency, the Willson case is, per-
haps, to be criticized because it fails to question the sagacity of enforcing
mere precatory words as a trust. The decision, however, is probably to be
justified on the ground of giving effect to the testatrix's intent, evidence of
which probably appeared in the trial in the lower court. G. E. S., '31.
WILLS-COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES-REVOCATION OF PRIOR DIsiNHERr-
ING WILL.-A witness who subscribes a will under which he is beneficially
interested is generally, by statute, declared competent, though the bequest
to him is void unless there is a sufficient number of other witnesses. The
application of these statutes in cases where the witness is indirectly inter-
ested under the will, or under a writing revoking a prior will, presents a
problem on which a variety of results has been reached. In a recent Ne-
braska case it was held that a will revoking prior wills was not invalidated
because one of the subscribing witnesses was an heir who had been disin-
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